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Author(s): Linda J. Tarver

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Linda J. Tarver

In Wisdom's House: T.E. Lawrence in the Near East

During his short career in the army, T.E. Lawrence wrote at length on the Middle East, from a variety of perspectives. His post-war notoriety has generated even more material about him from other authors. In 1976 alone, three new books about him were published: Peter Brent's *T.E. Lawrence*, John Mack's *A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T.E. Lawrence*, and Stanley and Rodelle Weintraub's *Lawrence of Arabia: The Literary Impulse*. Although each is largely successful in its circumscribed goals, none of the three attempts what most earlier works about Lawrence set out to do — to recount the facts of Lawrence's political and military activities in the Middle East and to evaluate his influence there. This task has not yet been done successfully, as earlier authors have been restricted by specific biases and limited perspectives.

The following discussion of Lawrence's role in and effect on Middle Eastern affairs during the world war and its aftermath is based on available primary sources, published and unpublished. Its purpose is to separate established fact from conjecture and the fantasy of the Lawrence image through examination of Lawrence's own writings.

Contemporary newspaper articles concerning different aspects of the war are early testimony to the impression a description of the war in the Middle East must have made on a public inured to the hardships and casualties of the Western Front. In the West, the Clausewitzian strategy of direct confrontation prevailed, and faulty applications of ideas borrowed from leading military theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries condemned to death millions on both sides. In Palestine, however, General Edmund Allenby, previously unsuccessful in France, consolidated a few pieced-together regiments to wage textbook examples of mechanized warfare

against the Ottoman Empire and its German allies, and sustained limited losses.¹ The astounding success of the Palestine Campaigns and of the British-supported Arab Revolt earned their participants considerable acclaim.

This was especially true for T.E. Lawrence, who rose from 2nd Lieutenant to Colonel during his service with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. He was recognized first by the American journalist Lowell Thomas, who in 1919, after several weeks' stay in the Middle East during the war, compiled an illustrated lecture on Allenby's victories. When the public evinced interest in the British officer dressed in Arab robes, working seemingly alone and independently among the Bedouin in the desert, Thomas created for Colonel Lawrence the image of a 'Paladin of Arabia' and 'Prince of Mecca.'

Lawrence's complicity in the transformation, born both of a tormented ego and a desire to aid the Arab political cause at Versailles, tended to sustain and amplify its effect. He provided not only Lowell Thomas, but also his biographer Robert Graves,² with information about his experiences, and aroused widespread curiosity over the private publication of his own book, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. With the appearance of *Revolt in the Desert*, which, as a popular abridgement of *Seven Pillars*, was in effect a distortion of an admittedly one-sided view of the war, the Lawrence legend was complete. Nevertheless, when the British public began to recoil from mention of the war, Lawrence came to be regarded as a posturing actor in a sideshow to the major conflict.

Myth-makers like Thomas found useful material in the background to Lawrence's involvement in the Middle East. Lawrence was influenced greatly by his mentor, the archaeologist David G. Hogarth.³ While a student at Oxford, Lawrence's interests, tastes, and political views were moulded by Hogarth, and Lawrence entered on an archaeological career under Hogarth's wing at the Hittite dig Carchemish, near Aleppo. When war broke out in 1914, thorough knowledge of the Middle East earned Hogarth considerable influence. He obtained for Lawrence a position in the cartographic section of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, where Lawrence's knowledge of Sinai geography was useful. Lawrence, ambitious for higher-level duties, secured transfers first to army intelligence and then to the overall military intelligence unit for most of the Middle East, M17. When the political intelligence unit known as the Arab Bureau was established in 1917 alongside M17 under Brig.-Gen. G.F. Clayton, Hogarth served as its Acting Director.⁴ Hogarth

drew Lawrence into Bureau work, and the pair initiated production of its newsletter, the *Arab Bulletin*.

Soon after the declaration, on 5 June 1916, of an Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire by Sharif Husain, the Amir of Mecca, Lawrence was appointed liaison officer and adviser to Husain's son Faisal and his forces in the Hijaz. He became one of a score of British officers working with Arab leaders, who both taught the Arabs demolition techniques useful in their raids on the Ottoman-operated Hijaz Railway, and also relayed pertinent intelligence to the British at Cairo. Here Lawrence was in his element, and he remained in action with the Arabs until shortly before the Armistice.

Lawrence's published writings include seventeen separate instances of action against the Turkish forces, in which he participated between January 1917 and October 1918. The total is brought to twenty-three when a list of operations conducted with Sharif Abdullah's Bedouin, included in a report by the then Captain Lawrence to Col. C.E. Wilson, British representative at Jidda, is taken into account. These actions took the form of a push up the Hijaz, from the region around Jidda, north to Aqaba, wherein the Arab irregular and regular forces were the principal agents. This was followed by operations in Palestine and Syria under General Allenby, in which the Arabs, under Sharif Faisal, became a flank force protecting Allenby's rear. The campaigns culminated in the occupation of Damascus by the Arabs and the establishment of Faisal's administration in the area. The details of Lawrence's military actions are as follows:

1. On 3 and 4 January 1917, in the area between Mubarak and Jabal Dhifran, Lawrence participated in a raid with 35 Muhamid Bedouin. Three Turkish patrol tents were attacked and their occupants killed. Lawrence's account appears in the *Arab Bulletin* of 15 February 1917 (all issues referred to here are printed in *Secret Despatches from Arabia* [London ca. 1940]).

2. On 24 March 1917, at Buair, Lawrence and a raiding party of Abdullah's Bedouin dynamited 60 rails and cut a telegraph line.

3. On 25 March 1917, at Abu al Naam, Lawrence and the same or a similar party dynamited 25 rails, damaged a water tower and two station buildings, set fire to several box-cars, a wood store and some tents, cut a telegraph line and damaged the engine and bogie of a train.

4. On 27 March 1917, at Istabl Antar, Lawrence and a raiding party of Abdullah's Bedouin dynamited 15 rails and cut a telegraph line.

5. Two of Lawrence's accounts differ on the action of 29 March 1917. His list to Col. Wilson reads 'March 29th. Jeddah. 10 rails dynamited, telegraph cut, 5 Turks killed.' His record in the *Arab Bulletin* of 13 May 1917, compiled at greater leisure and so perhaps with greater accuracy, states that on that date, at Abu al-Naam, Lawrence accompanied 300 Bedouin and four gunners under Sharif Shakir in a raid on a Turkish garrison comprised of 390 infantry. The action was successful, and resulted in the demolition of the northern end of the railroad station held by the Turks, and the temporary derailment of a passing train.

6. On 31 March 1917, at Buair (Lawrence wrote 'Buier'), Lawrence and a raiding party of Abdullah's Bedouin dynamited five rails and cut a telegraph line.

7. On 3 April 1917, at Hediah, Lawrence and a raiding party of Abdullah's Bedouin dynamited 11 rails and cut a telegraph line.

8. On 4 and 5 April 1917, in the area of Wadi Dhajji (between Km 1121 and al-Farshah), Lawrence and a party including the Bedouin chiefs Dakhilallah, Sultan, and Mohammad al Gadhi made a raid on the railway. A mine laid on the first day failed to explode despite the passage of two trains over it, but the party relaid and detonated it the following day, thereby blowing up the rails. They left after cutting down the nearby telegraph wire and 5 poles. Lawrence's description of this raid and that of 6 April also appears in the *Arab Bulletin* of 13 May 1917.

9. On 6 April 1917, between Mudhariij and Buair, Lawrence and a raiding party of Abdullah's Bedouin mined a locomotive, rendering it temporarily immobile. Later, at Buair, the group cut 22 rails, blew up a culvert, and cut a telegraph line.⁵

10. On 10 May 1917, at Dizaad or Wadi Diraa (Lawrence's records differ), Lawrence and a small party of Bedouin mined the crossover point of the railway, demolishing its rails. Lawrence describes the raid in Chapter 41 of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

11. On 4 June 1917, Lawrence began a clandestine trip north into Palestine, preparatory to Allenby's final assault in the area (Jerusalem would be taken by December of that year). His aims were to determine the attitudes of major sheiks in the area toward the Revolt, and to purchase support with gold where necessary. In his report to Clayton, Lawrence listed his itinerary as follows:

From 4-8 June, in the area of Ain al Barrida near Tadmor, Lawrence rode with two Bedouin companions to meet Sheik Dhanir of the Kawakiba Anaiza.

On 9 and 10 June, Lawrence participated in a raid (listed separately as Incident 12).

From 11-13 June, Lawrence rode from Ras Ba'albak to al Gabbon near Damascus, where on the 13th he met with the leader of an Arab secret society, Ali Rida al Rikabi, then also General Officer Commanding the Turkish Army troops in Damascus.

From 14 to 16 or 18 June, Lawrence rode to al Rudaina, and saw Sheik Saad ad-Din ibn Ali of the Laja, and thence to Salkhad, where he met Sultan Bey al-Atrash. Lawrence and his guides then rode to Azrak, where Lawrence spoke with Nuri and Nawaf Shaalan of the Rwala, later returning to Nabk.

Certain authors, most notably Suleiman Mousa, deny that Lawrence ever made the trip. Lawrence's records of it, though, are preserved in his final report to Clayton and in his personal diary.

12. On 9 and 10 June 1917, at Ras Ba'albak, Lawrence, Sheik Dhami, and a party of 35 Bedouin dynamited what Lawrence described in his report to Clayton as a 'small girder bridge.'

13. From 24 to 26 June 1917, in the area round Ifdain, Zarga, and Atwi Station, Lawrence and an undisclosed number of Bedouin made several raids. At Ifdain near Diraa they dynamited a section of curved rails (the hardest to replace). At Atwi they unsuccessfully attacked the station, but managed to kill three of the five garrison members, capture a flock of sheep, destroy a section of rail, and kill the four members of a telegraph line repair party. Lawrence describes the incident in the above-mentioned report to Clayton and in Chapter 50 of *Seven Pillars*.

14. On 6 July 1917, Lawrence, riding with Auda abu Tayih and the Howaitat, participated in the capture of Aqaba by means of a surprise attack from the desert. The Turkish guns defending the town had been cemented into position facing the Red Sea. Aqaba became the Arabs' major supply base until the end of the war. Lawrence describes the capture in Chapter 54 of *Seven Pillars*.

15. On 18 and 19 September 1917, at Km 587, Lawrence participated with a party of Bedouin in a raid in which some curved rails and a two-arched bridge in a drainage area were dynamited. The Turks sighted the Bedouin and returned to fight the next day, but the Arab group dynamited the Turkish troop train, killing survivors (27 dead, 14 wounded), and looting the cars. Lawrence recounts the raid

in the *Arab Bulletin* of 21 October 1917.

16. On 5 and 6 October 1917, in the area between Imshah and Hisma, Lawrence and a group of Bedouin blew up a Turkish patrol train from Ma'an. Lawrence describes the raid in Chapter 68 of *Seven Pillars*.

17. From 8 to 11 November 1917, between Minifir and Abu Sawana in Wadi Dhulail, Lawrence accompanied Ali ibn al-Husain al-Harithi, twenty Bedouin and about ten Indian gunners in a raid suggested to Lawrence by Allenby as a move to cut the Turkish approach route from the Yarmuk valley. At the outset, the group dynamited the train of Turkish General Mehmed Jemal Pasha, Commanding Officer of the 8th Army Corps. They then unsuccessfully attempted to dynamite a major bridge over the Yarmuk River, accidentally alerted the Turks to their presence, and barely escaped with their lives.

18. On 20 and 21 November 1917, Lawrence and a single Arab companion attempted a reconnaissance of the strategically important Diraa station. In Chapter 80 of *Seven Pillars*, Lawrence writes that he was captured, assaulted, and tortured by the station commander, but escaped and discovered the necessary information — the location of an approach road viable for later surprise attack — on his way back to his base at Azrak. The veracity of this episode — at least that of the assault and torture — has also been questioned.

19. On 25 January 1918, Lawrence directed the Battle of Sail al-Hasa or Tafilah. He used a feint — a sham retreat — to draw a Turkish Temporary Regiment commanded by Hamid Fakhri Bey (General Officer Commanding the 48th Division), into a funnel-shaped area between two ridges. The Turks were surprised and slaughtered by about two to three hundred Motalga and Howaitat tribesmen, and villagers from Tafilah and Aima, under (titular) command of Sharif Zaid (Husain's youngest son). The Arabs took two Skoda guns, 20 horses and mules, and 200 prisoners. The badly wounded froze to death. This was the only open confrontation between Turkish regulars and Arab irregulars under Lawrence's command during the course of the Revolt. Lawrence's description of the battle appears in the *Arab Bulletin* of 18 February 1918 and in Chapter 856 of *Seven Pillars*.

20. On 11 April 1918, at Jurf ad-Darawish near Kerak, Lawrence and a small party of Bedouin raided a Turkish railway patrol. They killed several of the Turks, but were outnumbered and forced to retreat. Lawrence describes the incident in Chapter 93 of *Seven Pillars*.

21. On 19 April 1918, Lawrence and a group of Bedouin participated in what constituted a 'regular' attack on the railway station of Tell Shahm, engineered by Alan Dawnay, who supervised military operations for the Arab Bureau. The method was a departure from Lawrence's preferred technique, but the operation was successful and the Bedouin looted the station. Lawrence describes the capture in Chapter 94 of *Seven Pillars*.

22. On 15 September 1918 at Umtaiye, Lawrence participated in a (British) armoured car raid on Tell Arar, a station on the Damascus railway line. The attackers blew up a bridge and captured a blockhouse. Lawrence recounts the action in the *Arab Bulletin* of 22 October 1918.

23. Between 1 and 18 September 1918, in the area from Mezerib to Nasib, Lawrence and Hubert Young laid 'tulip' explosives under a length of rail, then blew up the bridge at Nasib under cover of Nuri as-Said's Arab Army gunners. Lawrence's description of the raid appears in the *Arab Bulletin* of 22 October 1918, and in Chapter 109 of *Seven Pillars*.

It is apparent that much is uncertain about even the straightforward aspects of Lawrence's career in the Middle East. Lawrence fought not with compatriots but Bedouin, acted for the most part on his own initiative, and remained highly mobile. Other British liaison officers enjoyed similar freedoms, but they did not enter political battlegrounds, converse with Lowell Thomas, or write *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Hence Lawrence placed himself in a vulnerable position after the war — probably by intent; his letters reveal a consistent desire to mislead his correspondents. But however insignificant the mysteries he created, as well as those created by circumstance, it is necessary to sift through the untruths and partial truths in order to determine what Lawrence did accomplish.

Everything that Lawrence did or said during his military career has been questioned and criticized in some way by some author or commentator. Lawrence seems to have invited this dissection of his motives, activities, and influence. Such a situation, however, inevitably leads to contradictions among critiques at least as great as those in Lawrence's own writings. In his official reports, his articles in the *Arab Bulletin*, his various letters to his family and friends, and his literary effort in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence deliberately utilized differences of chronology and perspective to create an inconsistent picture of himself. Arbitrary distinctions alone credit some

sources and discount others. My criteria are: why should Lawrence have wanted to lie in any one source, and how much chance might he have had of lying successfully? Hence I am most likely to credit official reports, written usually on the spot and unselfconsciously, wherein Lawrence would have faced severe penalties for prevarication, and his articles in the *Arab Bulletin*, written for didactic and communicative purposes, in which Lawrence often attempted to convince colleagues of the logic of his methods.⁶

I am least likely to credit personal letters, in so far as Lawrence presented a different face to each correspondent, according to his perceptions of their tastes. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* is another inaccurate source. Lawrence made special note of this in the acknowledgment which heads the book: 'It does not pretend to be impartial. I was fighting for my hand, upon my own midden. Please take it as a personal narrative pieced out of memory.' Problems arise when Lawrence's correspondence and/or *Seven Pillars* contain the only or most complete accounts of crucial incidents, and when even these sources are mutually contradictory. It remains only to cite such instances, determine their importance to Lawrence's overall war effort, and estimate the relative credibility of the sources involved.

An early issue is the extent to which Lawrence was responsible for choosing Faisal as the leader — or figurehead, as the case may be — of the Arab Revolt. The problem is important, as it underlies the question of Lawrence's exact powers, whether granted, created, or imagined. The papers of the Arab Bureau reveal that Brig.-Gen. G.F. Clayton favoured British support of the Sharif and the Revolt, but only so far as to allow the Revolt to 'sink or swim' on its own strength.⁷ Moreover, it appears that Clayton relied heavily on Lawrence for information concerning both military operations in the northern Hijaz and the characters of the Arab leaders — most specifically, Faisal. Although Lawrence's reports to the Bureau contain criticism of Faisal — 'Faisal becomes a tribal leader, not a leader of tribes'⁸ — the underlying impression that Lawrence considered him the only possible effective leader of the Revolt is clear. Hence Clayton, in encouraging Faisal's leadership, acted in accordance with and partly as a result of Lawrence's ideas.

The only available published sources mentioning the question are *Seven Pillars* (note to Book I, Chapter 8 et seq.), and extracts from the diary of Ronald Storrs, former Oriental Secretary to the Residency in Cairo, reprinted in his autobiography, *Orientalism*. Lawrence gives the reader the distinct impression that he was empowered by

outside authority (presumably the British high command, he does not specify), to select a leader for the then-slackening Revolt (p. 64). Since much of *Seven Pillars* concerns the Amir Faisal, Lawrence appears to present himself as Faisal's kingmaker. Storrs, however, notes that his diary for the Red Sea voyage to Jidda (Lawrence's introduction to the Hijaz), makes little mention of Lawrence,⁹ and that his principal reasons for requesting Lawrence's presence were the pleasure of the latter's company and the soundness of his advice. Sound advice is not equivalent to authority, however effective it may be in persuasion. In *Seven Pillars*, then, Lawrence presents what he regarded as his personal power to bring events to pass, while allowing the reader to draw a false conclusion from the text. The result is an example of the clash between Lawrence's desire to produce a literary epic, and his wish to give a truthful record of his role in the Revolt.

A second issue is that of French participation in the Revolt. As the Allied powers later utilized their war records in the Middle East as proof of their right to mandates and spheres of influence, the importance of the question is patent. Despite their common war effort, Britain and France were well aware of each other as pre-eminent world powers. Both stood to benefit in the event of victory, but each eyed the other warily for the duration, suspecting independent attempts at colonial self-aggrandisement. Members of M17 and the Arab Bureau were especially interested in France's support for the Arab Revolt, and were careful to ensure that Britain's contributions exceeded their ally's.¹⁰ The conclusion early in 1917 of an agreement between Mark Sykes and Georges Picot, as to which European power would predominate after the war in what Middle Eastern region, rocked the boat of British Middle Eastern policy not a little. Brig.-Gen. Clayton and Hogarth led the majority of Arab Bureau members in calling for amendment of the agreement, insisting that such early establishment of French spheres of influence was both premature and possibly deleterious to British interests. Hogarth was especially apprehensive of any vague joint colonial effort in the Middle East; like many of his British contemporaries, he knew and feared the French colonial record in that area and North Africa.

In this atmosphere the ardent Francophobia espoused by Lawrence was neither outstanding nor unwelcome, though his colleagues' reception of his ideas was far cooler after the war. What served to exacerbate the situation during the conflict was Lawrence's aversion to most regular soldiers. Hence a double antipathy strongly

coloured his attitude toward Col. Edouard Brémond, head of the French Military Mission to the Hijaz, and his staff. The sentiments are less prevalent in Lawrence's official writings than in *Seven Pillars*. The latter records Lawrence's clashes with Brémond over the occupation of Aqaba. Brémond had wanted to make an Allied landing there from the Red Sea, which Lawrence successfully countered with his plan for a surprise attack from the landward side of the port. In another instance, during the raid of 5 and 6 October 1917, Lawrence instructed the French commander at Aqaba, Lt. Pisani, in mining techniques. He writes in the *Arab Bulletin* of 21 October 1917 'M. Pisani, Faiz el-Moayyad, the Lutfi al-Asali, are now, I think, competent to lay mines by themselves. I was very well satisfied with all three of them.'¹¹ In Chapter 68 of *Seven Pillars*, Lawrence describes Pisani as 'an active soldier who burned for distinction — and distinctions.' Brémond opens his book, *Le Hedjaz dans la Guerre Mondiale*, by stating¹² that he was moved to write his account after reading what he regarded as the misleading history given in *Revolt in the Desert*.

A third issue concerns Lawrence's actual military powers during the Revolt, the major point of disagreement between disciples and opponents of Lawrence. It is important to make a distinction between the command of regular and that of irregular soldiers. The first implies an established hierarchy, complete with rank and precedent; the second implies the absence of all but primitive authority. As Lawrence most often led irregular Bedouin fighters, and was rarely in a position to command any of his countrymen, it is predictable that his role in the military operation of the war should be ambiguous. It is very clear from the papers of the Arab Bureau, however, that Lawrence was by no means leader of the Revolt as a whole, but rather one among a group of British officers in command of various Bedouin forces, dispersed throughout the Hijaz and also Ibn Saud's Najd. Although a 'gallant' officer according to Brig.-Gen. Clayton, Lawrence was not unique.¹³ Lawrence himself disliked the nebulous qualities of his position when he felt his particular skills unsuitable to a given task, but made use of the ambiguity in his reports to his superior officers — which often by-passed intermediate echelons.¹⁴

Lawrence's attitude toward his position in his various writings is also noteworthy. In the chapter of *Seven Pillars* dealing with the strategy of the Arab Revolt (33), Lawrence writes 'As I have shown, I was unfortunately as much in command of the campaign as I

pleased, and was untrained.' The use of the phrase 'As I have shown' indicates that Lawrence was not attempting to depict himself as holding delegated powers of command, but as having been forced to assume de facto command. From the same text, the antecedent of 'campaign' can only be taken to mean the Arab Revolt. Hence Lawrence, at least in *Seven Pillars*, believed himself the principal agent in the Arab Revolt and its success. Other factors, such as the participation of the Arabs and their leaders in the Revolt, and the liaison work of other Allied officers, do not enter into the discussion. Lawrence's statement can be considered seriously only if it is restricted in the sense of the chapter, to mean that he was the chief influence in determining the military strategy, and especially the tactics, of the Revolt. Theories do not a commander make, nor one man a war. Yet, it is true that under Faisal, and later under Allenby, Lawrence was granted considerable numbers of men and supplies, and free rein to implement his plans. The frequent success of the efforts he engineered, and his skill in generalizing thereon in strategical and tactical terms, have earned him respect in some quarters as an originator of modern guerrilla warfare.

It is also disputed whether Lawrence made the clandestine trip north to Damascus in June 1917. The complex knowledge Lawrence might have gained on such a trip would have been useful, but the major importance of the claim is for Lawrence's detractors, who could prove Lawrence to have been a complete liar if they could demonstrate that the trip never took place. Lawrence's detailed report on the trip to Clayton, who received it well and apparently acted on the basis of it,¹⁵ is reprinted in the former's *Letters*, and a contemporary account of the journey remains in Lawrence's military diary. The trip is not discussed in *Seven Pillars*. Suleiman Mousa attempts¹⁶ to prove that Lawrence never went north, on the testimony of Auda abu Tayih's son Muhammad, then a twelve-year-old boy, and Nasib al-Bakri, the Syrian leader whom Lawrence had long distrusted.¹⁷ The trip was intended to be secret, hence it is not surprising that no absolute proof of it exists. The evidence appears to lie in Lawrence's favour, though, as it is highly unlikely that he should have lied to his superior in an official report.

Mousa has also noted¹⁸ that Lawrence could and did lie about other events. Certain discrepancies among passages in *Seven Pillars* and Lawrence's letters demonstrate this trait. The following passages all describe the raid of 18-19 September 1917:

[in a letter to a 'Friend', dated 24 September 1917] I'm in Akaba for two days . . . that for me spells civilisation, though it doesn't mean other than Arab togs and food, but does mean you lunch where you dined; and therefore happy. The last stunt has been a few days on the Hijaz Railway, in which I potted a train with two engines (oh, the gods were kind), and we killed superior numbers, and I got a good Baluch prayer-rug, and lost all my kit, and nearly my little self.

I'm not going to last out this game much longer: nerves going and temper wearing thin, and one wants an unlimited account of both.¹⁹

[in a letter to W.G. Stirling, dated 25 September 1917] The Turks then nearly cut us off as we looted the train, and I lost some baggage, and nearly myself. My loot is a superfine red Baluch prayer-rug. I hope this sounds the fun it is. The only pity is the sweat to work them up and the wild scramble while it lasts.²⁰

[from *Seven Pillars*, Chapter 67] In the end of the waggon sat an ancient and very tremulous Arab dame, who asked me what it was all about. I explained. She said that though an old friend and hostess of Feisal, she was too infirm to travel and must wait her death there. I replied that she would not be harmed. The Turks were almost arrived and would recover what remained of the train. She accepted this, and begged me to find her old negress, to bring her water. The slave woman filled a cup from the spouting tender of the first engine (delicious water, from which Lewis was slaking his thirst), and then I led her to her grateful mistress. Months after there came to me secretly from Damascus a letter and pleasant little Baluchi carpet from the lady Ayesha, daughter of Jellal el Lel, of Medina, in memory of an odd meeting.

[from the *Arab Bulletin* of October 1917] The Arabs now plundered the train, while I fired a box of guncotton on the front engine and damaged it more extensively. I fear, however, that it is still capable of repair. The conditions were not helpful to good work, for there were many prisoners and women hanging on to me, I had to keep peace among the plunderers, and the Turks from the south opened fire on us at long range just as the train surrendered, our covering force on that side having come in to share the booty. The baggage in the train was very large and the Arabs went mad over it. In any case a Bedouin force no longer exists when plunder has been obtained, since each man only cares to get off home with it. I was therefore left with the two British NCOs and Zaal and Howeimil of the Arabs, to ensure the safety of the guns and machine-guns.²¹

In the light of these passages the reader may be hesitant to believe the description in *Seven Pillars* of the incident at Diraa, in which Lawrence writes that he was captured, sexually assaulted, and beaten by the Bey and soldiers of the station garrison. The episode is important not only because of Lawrence's serious accusation against the Bey, who survived the war by some years, but because Lawrence regarded it as responsible for the breaking of his will and the crushing of his desire to participate in the Revolt. The only descriptions of the attack appear in Lawrence's manuscript, the first printing (Oxford 1922), and the private publication in 1926 (known as the

Subscriber's edition) of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Textual changes were made in the chapter, in both the Oxford and Subscriber's editions, and the name of the Bey was also changed. Lawrence never mentioned the incident in any official report or the *Arab Bulletin*, and George Bernard Shaw wrote later that Lawrence had denied to him that it had ever taken place.²² The only evidence to the contrary is provided by Richard Meinertzhagen in his *Middle East Diary*, who wrote that Lawrence made use of a private shower in his room soon after the war's end, at which time Meinertzhagen noticed long scars across Lawrence's back. Lawrence told Meinertzhagen that he had been dragged by a camel over barbed wire. No real proof of the capture, beating, and assault has yet been established.

The unsuccessful Yarmuk bridge raid, Lawrence's experience at Diraa and Allenby's capture of Jerusalem took place in quick succession in November and December of 1917. Just as Lawrence's efforts had reached a nadir, the overall tide of the war in the Middle East turned in the Allies' favour. At the end of January, however, Lawrence's part in the Battle of Tafilah, also known as the Battle of Sail al Hasa, earned him the Distinguished Service Order and later considerable recognition for outstanding command. The issue is whether or not Lawrence commanded the Arab forces during the battle and, if he did, in what capacity. It is important because it demonstrates the ambiguity both of individual command and of Anglo-Arab military relations in general during the war. Lawrence's first description of the battle, written on 25 or 26 January 1918, appeared in the *Arab Bulletin* of 18 February,²³ and was expanded in the version appearing in Chapters 85 and 86 of *Seven Pillars*. The only mention of it in a published letter, one written to his family on 6 February 1918, is uninformative: 'We had a fight north of Tafilah the other day — the Turks attacked us and we annihilated them. Took 23 machine guns and two guns, all in working order. Our loss 20 killed, theirs about 400.'²⁴ Lawrence commonly made use of the first person plural to describe participation in military actions.

As Suleiman Mousa notes,²⁵ the 'we' is preserved throughout the *Arab Bulletin* report of the battle, excepting the instances which note Lawrence's own reconnaissance of the field, and that in which he 'persuaded' Sharif Husain's son Zaid to send up reinforcements for the feint manoeuvre. It is also preserved in the *Seven Pillars* account regarding all commands or directions given the Arabs. Only at the conclusion of the description does Lawrence write 'By my decision to fight, I had killed twenty or thirty of our six hundred men, and the

wounded would be perhaps three times as many. It was one-sixth of our force gone on a verbal triumph, for the destruction of this thousand poor Turks would not affect the issue of the war.'

There were no British witnesses to the battle. Mousa writes that he visited the site preparatory to writing his biography of Lawrence in the early 1960s, and questioned surviving veterans of the battle as to its details. 'None of the people I spoke to recalled seeing Lawrence give an order or direct anybody to do anything. None of them believed that Lawrence was in any position of power, nor did they think any of the people of Tafilah were prepared to be influenced by him'.²⁶ This passage may readily be contrasted with Lawrence's personal precepts on the most effective methods by which a foreign officer might deal with the Arabs. Known as the 'Twenty-Seven Articles', they appeared in the *Arab Bulletin* of 20 August 1917. The following extracts are especially pertinent:

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight rein of his ideas, and push him forward as firmly as possibly (sic), but secretly, so that no-one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if you have the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interference the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.²⁷

If Lawrence had followed his own precepts, and there is little reason to assume otherwise, it might have been possible for him to 'command' and yet remain largely unnoticed by the Arabs. Men in war take more notice of their personal situations and chances of survival than of the ranks and orders of those about them. It is a moot question as to whether the unproven commander Zaid, aided only by Lt. Subhi al-Umari, might have led a 600-man force, composed largely of the villagers of Aima and Tafilah, to victory against Hamid Fakhri Bey's Temporary Regiment comprised in part of 'a *murettab* battalion, with a company of gendarmes, a detachment of 100 cavalry, two Australian quick-firing mountain guns, and twenty-three machine guns.'²⁸

Trying to determine what is true is complicated by Lawrence's

tendency to exaggerate. The weakness is important because it hinders the reader from giving Lawrence credit where it is really due — a circumstance which Lawrence might perversely have intended. One instance of blatant exaggeration appears in both semi-official and non-official sources. In the *Arab Bulletin* of 22 October 1918, recounting the raid of 17-18 September 1918, Lawrence writes:

. . . we were in position west of Nasib station. After considerable resistance and artillery work, we were able to carry the post on the big bridge north of the station, and to blow up the bridge. This was my seventy-ninth bridge. It had three seven-metre arches, was about twenty-five feet high, and had piers five feet thick — quite one of the finest we have destroyed.

[In Ch. 112 of *Seven Pillars* describing the same raid] Hurriedly we piled gun-cotton against the piers, which were about five feet thick and twenty-five feet high; a good bridge, my seventy-ninth and strategically most critical, since we were going to live opposite it at Umtaiye until Allenby came forward and relieved us. So I had determined to leave not a stone of it in place.²⁹

What Lawrence means by the phrase ‘my seventy-ninth bridge’ is unclear. It appears to indicate that the bridge at Nasib was the seventy-ninth Lawrence destroyed. After tracing Lawrence’s whereabouts each day for the several years of his military career, I was able to find records not of seventy-nine ruined bridges, but only of the twenty-three various actions already described. To have destroyed seventy-nine bridges would have required superhuman legwork and impossible deception. Even if Lawrence was indicating the number of bridges blown either by him or by Arabs he had taught, the author stretches the line between simple hyperbole and complete falsehood. The motive behind such a statement is also elusive, but might be explained by Lawrence’s comment ‘There was a craving to be famous; and a horror of being known to like being known. Contempt for my passion for distinction made me refuse every offered honour’ (in Chapter 103 of *Seven Pillars*). It was perhaps an intentional arrogance, a premeditated *hubris*, so to speak, which acted as sole governor on Lawrence’s boundless will. Hence he could have lied in order to be discovered and discredited.

Lawrence failed to realize in what ways circumstance, in his case the sheer momentum of the Allied war effort, might modify his individual intentions. International politics created a complex situation regarding the claims of the Arabs, Britain, France and the Zionists to territorial rights in the Middle East after the war, as established by the Husain-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. The question of whether Faisal and/or

Husain knew of the existence of the Sykes-Picot and Balfour documents before the war's end underlies the later difficulties of European mandatory powers and Arabs fighting for independence. The papers of the Arab Bureau state that Husain was never 'officially' told the precise terms of the Agreement during the war, although he was made aware that British influence would be greater in some areas and French influence in others.³⁰ Husain's correspondence with the Bureau indicates his anxiety over any forthcoming post-war French colonial interests in the Middle East; he apparently thought that obtaining and maintaining British goodwill toward his 'kingdom' would provide a bulwark against the French onslaught. Arab Bureau members were painfully aware of his misguided strategy but were not at liberty to clarify the Anglo-French position.

From 1916 until 1919, Lawrence acted as go-between for the British government and Faisal, a role important in the conduct of Anglo-Hashemite relations. The immediate issue is whether or not Lawrence himself had unofficially informed Faisal of any agreement; if so, when, and if the British government knew of his actions. Lawrence did not write publicly of the matter until the 1920s, in Chapters 48 and 101 of *Seven Pillars*; and in response to queries on the subject from his biographer Col. Basil H. Liddell Hart.

A discussion in Chapter 48 of *Seven Pillars* of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence states 'The last modest clause concealed a treaty (kept secret, till too late, from McMahon, and therefore from the Sherif), by which France, England and Russia agreed to annex some of these promised areas, and to establish their respective spheres of influence over all the rest. Rumours of the fraud reached Arab ears from Turkey.' In his comments to Liddell Hart, Lawrence implied that McMahon did not learn of the existence of the treaty, which had been signed on 16 May 1916, until April or May of 1917, at which time 'Sykes [told McMahon] casually "Haven't you heard of my Treaty?"' Others nearly threw up.'³¹ In Chapter 101 of *Seven Pillars*, Lawrence describes Faisal's abortive negotiations with Jemal Pasha for a separate peace with Turkey, stating that he purposely kept the British government in the dark about them. Lawrence writes that he abetted the Arab-Turkish machinations because they provided a safety valve for Faisal, whose position with regard to future Arab independence the Sykes-Picot Agreement had rendered shaky. In order to keep Faisal on the straight and narrow, he continues,

Fortunately, I had early betrayed the [Sykes-Picot] treaty's existence to Feisal, and had convinced him that his escape was to help the British so much that after peace they would not be able, for shame, to shoot him down in its fulfillment; while, if the Arabs did as I intended, there would be no one-sided talk of shooting. I begged him to trust not in our promises, like his father, but in his own strong performance.

Elie Kedourie, in his *England and the Middle East*, has remarked the inconsistencies in Lawrence's arguments:

In May 1917, Sykes and Picot went to Jidda and saw the Sharif, now King of the Hijaz . . . The King of the Hijaz informed Lawrence in July 1917 of these interviews and Lawrence reported that the King was extremely pleased to have trapped M. Picot into the admission that France will be satisfied with the position that Great Britain desired in Iraq. The Sharif not only knew about French plans in Syria, but Lawrence knew that he knew. This was in July 1917 at the latest.³²

Kedourie assumes³³ that Lawrence, cognizant very early on of both the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, undertook to defeat French ambitions in the Middle East, ignore the British agreement with the French, and champion the Arab cause as a morally worthy idea. Such a motive, he believes, would explain why Lawrence in *Seven Pillars* made the Arabs appear as victims of a political dupe. There is evidence both supporting and contradicting this theory. In the original first chapter of *Seven Pillars*, omitted in the Subscriber's edition, Lawrence writes 'It was evident from the beginning that if we won the war these promises (those made to the Arab leaders) would be dead paper.'³⁴ Yet Lawrence's own actions belied these words, for in General Harry Chauvel's record of the meeting between General Allenby and Faisal in Damascus, at which Lawrence, among others, was present, Allenby told Faisal of the French Protectorate to be established in Syria. Faisal did not accept this and denied ever having known of French intentions in Syria. Chauvel writes 'The Chief turned to Lawrence and said: "But did you not tell him that the French were to have the Protectorate over Syria?" Lawrence said "No Sir, I did not."³⁵ Hence Kedourie's theory works if in this altercation, which immediately preceded Lawrence's departure from Damascus, both Lawrence and Faisal lied to Allenby. Their motive in feigning ignorance of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement would seemingly have been to force the British hand into allowing the establishment of an independent Arab state before the French had a chance to move in.

This syllogism is complicated by Lawrence's discussion in *Seven Pillars* of Faisal's negotiations with Jemal Pasha. For if Lawrence

had not known previously of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, he might still have had cause to lie about his and the Arabs' ignorance in *Seven Pillars*, to cover any embarrassment he might have had about Arab dealings with the Turks. In Lawrence's picture, the hands of all participants are soiled, but the European hands are the dirtier. Most evidence does support Kedourie's theory, though, as it would not have been beyond Lawrence, confident in the ultimate rectitude of his ideal, to lie to Allenby. Such an occurrence would also explain the rift between Allenby and Lawrence, which probably caused Lawrence's sudden departure from the Middle East.

To assess Lawrence and his influence is in part to assess the Arab Revolt and the British Middle Eastern policy which supported it. Although it is well to refer after the fact to the Revolt and even the Palestine Campaigns in toto as sideshows, considerable difficulty might have arisen had Kut and Gallipoli not been isolated incidents. Before Allenby's arrival in the Middle East, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had been incapable of advancing across Gaza. Had the Ottoman Empire succeeded in penetrating British defences in Egypt or in withstanding the later advance through Palestine, the physical as well as psychological loss would have been devastating.

The Arab Revolt earned British support through the Foreign Office, despite opposition from the Government of India. Although a jerry-built structure, it served the purpose of diversion. General A.P. Wavell, author of the semi-official history *The Palestine Campaigns*, wrote:

Its value to the British commander was great, since it diverted considerable Turkish reinforcements and supplies to the Hejaz, and protected the right flank of the British armies in their advance through Palestine. Further, it put an end to German propaganda in southwestern Arabia and removed any danger of the establishment of a German submarine base in the Red Sea. These were important services and worth the subsidies in gold and munitions expended on the Arab forces.³⁶

In his writings Lawrence obviously overplayed his role in the Revolt, but others have underplayed it in reaction to him. Although Lawrence was not the only Briton among Bedouin, his tact in relations with them served as an example to his more traditional colleagues and prevented serious discord in the Anglo-Hashemite alliance. Lawrence regarded the Revolt as 'an Arab war waged and led by Arabs for an Arab aim in Arabia,'³⁷ an effective outlook. Not only Wavell,³⁸ but also George Antonius, author of the somewhat polemical *Arab Awakening*,³⁹ notes that the Revolt gained momentum, which it had sadly lacked, shortly after Lawrence's arrival in

Arabia. Lawrence's success may be traced to his efforts in preaching and teaching revolt to the Arabs, by working through Faisal, Auda, and other leaders while still retaining a quietly British image.

Just as Lawrence did not lead the Arab Revolt, so also he did not formulate its strategy. Yet as in the attack on Aqaba and the battle of Tafila he showed an ability to gamble wisely, seizing worthwhile tactical opportunities. By involving the Bedouin in generally small but successful attacks on material and avoiding open clashes with the Turkish infantry, he naturally kept up the Arabs' willingness to fight. This was a lesson Abdullah and other Arab leaders had failed to learn in their unsuccessful siege of Medina.

In order to execute the tactics he and others had devised, Lawrence both taught the Bedouin modern demolition techniques — following the example of his predecessor, Capt. Shakespear — and adapted the ancient Bedouin lifestyle to the practices of modern war. The latter involved demonstrating to the nomads the similarities between a traditional *razzia* and a raid on a train, using familiar mounts and arms, and allowing plunder. Adaptation also meant allowing tribes to remain within their *diraa*, or claimed territory, to fight. Moving northward to their objectives in Syria, the leaders of the Revolt 'climbed ladders of tribes,' enlisting new recruits as they went. When Faisal's forces were placed under Allenby's command in the final stages of the campaign, Lawrence was also responsible for facilitating the Bedouin's exposure to mechanized warfare.

After the war, Lawrence attempted to distil his military experiences into theory. This took the form of a chapter in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, an article on guerrilla warfare in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and posthumously published dialogues on strategy with his biographer, Col. Liddell Hart.⁴⁰ Their influence is open to question. Lawrence presented himself in his writings as an intelligent commander, and advocated lack of direct confrontation — through maximization of intelligence technique — as the most effective means of warfare. But he admitted even in *Seven Pillars* that his theories developed after the fact, and that in the field his only thought had been for the situation of the moment. Despite the inconsistencies in Lawrence's arguments,⁴¹ *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* is highly regarded by some modern theorists on guerrilla warfare. The authors of a textbook on oriental guerrilla movements write that 'Lawrence is regarded as the first theorist on partisan warfare.'⁴² The author of a tactical manual believes that *Seven Pillars* 'is highly recommended reading for the student of guerrilla warfare, par-

ticularly his discussion of the elements of revolt, tactical deductions, and motives of the insurgents.⁴³

Lawrence's beliefs also received exposure through Liddell Hart, a military historian and analyst. Liddell Hart was impressed by Lawrence's achievements and sought to publicize them, not only in his biography of Lawrence, but also in his more theoretical works (such as *Strategy: the Indirect Approach*).⁴⁴ Although Liddell Hart was to learn later that the indirect approach was seriously flawed,⁴⁵ his precepts and Lawrence's example helped in some capacity to eradicate the notion of war as the simple 'effusion of blood' which had been so prevalent from 1914 to 1918.

Lawrence exercised political influence in the Middle East in much the same indirect manner as he carried out his military goals, and with similar limited effect. Had he remained at the Arab Bureau offices in Cairo, his voice alone would have carried little weight among British policy-makers. His unique experiences in the desert with Faisal's forces, however, gave his recommendations — whether military or political in orientation — an authority which his desk-bound superiors respected. Lawrence further had the ability to guide the actions of the Arab leaders. Col. Brémond, Head of the French Military Mission to the Hijaz, noted rather sourly while at Aqaba in 1917, that of the score of British officers there, only Lawrence exercised political authority with the Bedouin.⁴⁶ Sharif Abdullah distrusted this ability, which he describes in his *Memoirs*:

We had been established at Wadi 'Ais a week when twenty-seven camelmen under the command of Capt. Lawrence arrived, from my brother Faisal, to supervise the wrecking of the railway. I did not like his intervention as I was suspicious of his influence among the tribes . . . the general dislike of Lawrence's presence was quite clear. He tried to make contact with the tribes but could not do so, because of the guard which was placed over him, and thus causing ill-feeling between us and the British. In Faisal's army, however, he had a free hand and through the money he spent and the words he talked became the uncrowned king of the Arabs and was regarded as the moving spirit in the Revolt . . . Lawrence appeared only to require people who had no views of their own, that he might impress his personal ideas upon them.⁴⁷

Doubtless Lawrence's political as well as military influence on Faisal and his allies such as Auda abu Tayih of the Howaitat and Nuri Shaalan of the Rwala, helped to smooth over petty discords and consolidate the tribes long enough for a powerful united effort in the Revolt. Yet Lawrence involved himself so deeply in his task that he lost sight at times of his British identity and loyalty. He could not reconcile himself to contradictions between British and Arab

interests, a vacillation which proved fatal at Versailles in 1919, when it became evident that Faisal's Syrian kingdom would not be supported by Britain, and that even if established by Arab force it would succumb to the ensuing French mandate. Zeine N. Zeine comments:

Unfortunately, Lawrence himself, who should have known better, did much harm, psychologically and morally, to the Arab Cause, without, obviously, meaning to do so [by] taking such a deep and personal interest in the Arab Revolt and identifying himself with its purpose and the success of its execution . . .⁴⁸

Yet Lawrence did participate in positive political achievements. He was a member of the Cairo Conference of 1921 which established Faisal on the throne of Iraq, then under the British sphere of influence, and Abdullah on the throne of British-mandated Transjordan. Faisal's dynasty lasted until the coup of Abdul Karim-Qasim in 1958, and Abdullah lived to become king of independent Transjordan in 1948. After his assassination in 1951, succession passed eventually to his favourite grandchild, King Hussein.

Lawrence served in the Middle East for a short time following the war. Soon after the Cairo Conference, he was sent on a mission to Transjordan by Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary. Churchill wrote later 'He had plenary powers. He used them with his old vigour. He removed officers. He used force. He restored complete tranquillity. Everyone was delighted with the success of his mission, but nothing would persuade him to continue.'⁴⁹ A subsequent effort to mitigate the demands of Sharif, now King, Husain in the Hijaz so as not to provoke the enmity of Ibn Saud, proved fruitless. Britain held treaties with both leaders, and was bound not to take sides in any conflict between the two. Ibn Saud's army moved westward across Arabia to exert pressure on Husain's meagre forces, and finally caused Husain and his third son, Ali, to flee in 1924. Two years earlier, Lawrence had relinquished his post at the Colonial Office, and refused further contact with the Middle East. He entered the Royal Air Force as an aircraftman, where he remained, with a brief hiatus, until shortly before his death in 1935.

Lawrence's career in the Middle East was representative of a transitional period in British social and diplomatic history. Lawrence himself was caught between the examples of Baden-Powell at Mafeking and e.e. cummings in the Enormous Room, and between the colonial policies of the Foreign Office and the Government of India. In

the course of the war, imperialism lost its aura of morality and conscience, but the system of compromises replacing it at Versailles and Cairo did not satisfy self-conscious men such as Lawrence. He responded by becoming Bernard Shaw's 'Private Napoleon Alexander Trotsky Meek', a forceful personality retreating into a position of power without responsibility.

Lawrence's cavalier reaction to and acceptance of authority created difficulties in the definition of his role, actions, and influence in the Middle East during the war. Extreme opinions, whether based on acquaintance with Lawrence, or emotional reactions to writings by or about him, or even on the most painstaking critical analysis of the man and his era, have prevailed throughout the half-century of popular and scholarly writing on Lawrence's role in the Middle East. The weaknesses inherent in this trend demonstrate that the subject is far from closed.

NOTES

1. See Brian Gardner, *Allenby* (London 1965).
2. The biography is Graves' *Lawrence and the Arabian Adventure* (New York 1928). For background to its writing see Graves' section in *T.E. Lawrence to His Biographers* (Garden City, New York 1963), and Graves' autobiography *Good-bye to All That* (Garden City, New York 1975).
3. Philip Knightley and Colin Simpson, *The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia* (London 1969), 18-31.
4. Material in the Arab Bureau Papers, which have been deposited in the Public Record Office, London. Items dealing with the foundation of the Arab Bureau are in Volume FO/882/2; and those items used here are in series from ARB/15/1 to ARB/18/3.
5. For Incidents, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/5, Item HRG/17/29.
6. For example, T.E. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches from Arabia* (London 1940), 126-33.
7. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/3, Item AP/17/18.
8. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/6, Item HRG/16/71B.
9. Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms* (London 1937), 199-200.
10. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/3, Items AP/17/6, 7, 12.
11. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches*, 140-41.
12. Edouard Brémont, *Le Hedjaz dans la Guerre Mondiale* (Paris 1931), 9.
13. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/4, Item HR/17/16.
14. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/6, Items HRG/16/71B, HRG/16/95.

15. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/16, Item SP/17/39.
16. Suleiman Mousa, *T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View* (London 1966), 72-79.
17. David Garnett, ed., *The Letters of T.E. Lawrence* (London 1938), 226. Lawrence mentioned his misgivings about Nasib al-Bakri in his 'secret' report to Brig.-Gen. Clayton, writing 'Nessib El Bekri is volatile and short-sighted, as are most town-Syrians, and will not carry them [his instructions] out exactly — but no other agent was available.'
18. Mousa, op. cit., 97-98.
19. Garnett, op. cit., 237-38.
20. Knightley and Simpson, op. cit., 78-79.
21. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches*, 135-36.
22. John Mack, *A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T.E. Lawrence* (Boston 1976), 229.
23. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches*, 150-53.
24. M.R. Lawrence, ed., *The Home Letters of T.E. Lawrence and His Brothers* (Oxford 1954), 347.
25. Mousa, op. cit., 142.
26. *Ibid.*, 139.
27. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches*, 126-33.
28. *Ibid.*, 150.
29. *Ibid.*, 165.
30. Arab Bureau Papers, Volume FO/882/16, Item SP/17/31.
31. Liddell Hart in *T.E. Lawrence to His Biographers*, Section II, 60.
32. Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London 1956), 97. C. Ernest Dawn, in his *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (University of Illinois Press 1973) disputes Kedourie's contention that Husain knew fully the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (p. 112), but does believe the Sharif was made aware as early as the meeting in May 1917, of French ambitions in some Arab lands.
33. *Ibid.*, 98-99. (i.e., Kedourie).
34. A.W. Lawrence, ed., *Oriental Assembly* (New York 1940), 145.
35. Knightley and Simpson, op. cit., 95-96.
36. A.P. Wavell, *The Palestine Campaigns* (London 1929), 56.
37. A.W. Lawrence, op. cit., 140.
38. Wavell, op. cit., 203.
39. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia 1939), 216.
40. Liddell Hart in *T.E. Lawrence to His Biographers*, Section II.
41. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla* (Boston 1976), 170.
42. Baljit Singh and Mei Ko-Wang, *Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York 1971), 3.
43. N.I. Klonis, *Guerrilla Warfare: Analysis and Projections* (New York 1972), 59.
44. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York 1954).
45. Laqueur, op. cit., 171.
46. Brémond, op. cit., 274.
47. Philip Graves, ed., *The Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan* (New York 1950), 170.
48. Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (Beirut 1960), 215.
49. A.W. Lawrence, ed., *T.E. Lawrence by His Friends* (London 1937), 199.

Linda Tarver

is currently a student at Temple University Law School, Philadelphia. Her bachelor's thesis, written while a senior at Princeton University, is entitled *Between Opposing Forces: The Arab Bureau in World War I*.