By Cordula Dittmer and Daniel F. Lorenz

Original German version last updated on March 11, 2022, 3:00 PM

Translated version published 30.07.2024

Due to the now very dynamically evolving situation, we have decided to update our contribution from 03/05/2022 (see below).

Since the summer of 2015, we at the KFS initially focused on the KatFlucht project, and from October 2018, in the WAKE project, we examined the management of the refugee situation in 2015/16 by German and European civil protection and disaster relief services. It was unforeseeable that less than seven years later, we would once again be dealing with massive refugee movements in Europe. In the (social) media, references are increasingly being made to the end of World War II or to 2015/16. The UNHCR speaks of an exodus that occurs only very rarely. Meanwhile, the UNHCR has classified the situation in Ukraine as a “Level 3 emergency,” its highest category. As of March 10, 2022, the UNHCR had registered 2,338,262 refugees. Our analytical focus is on how state and non-state actors, especially civil protection and disaster relief services, are managing the situation: We are currently observing both very similar and quite different coping mechanisms compared to 2015/16.

We have therefore compiled some initial hypotheses from the perspective of social science disaster research, especially regarding Germany, with which we want to provide food for thought about where there are similarities, where there are differences, and where developments in the field of civil protection and disaster relief have taken place from 2015/16 to today.

• Migration movements from the East due to armed conflicts were, at least until the collapse of the Eastern Bloc following World War II, a significant scenario for German civil defense (Dittmer/Lorenz 2020). However, corresponding planning and resources were almost completely lost from view at least until 2015/16, with the result that by 2015/16, hardly any relevant knowledge remained. Some of this was reactivated for managing the refugee situation in 2015/16, and as a consequence, larger care concepts for future humanitarian emergencies, such as the Labor 5000 project, were initiated. At the same time, it must also be noted that since 2015/16, many structures have been dismantled again and learning experiences have been documented only to a very limited extent.
• Germany, unlike in 2015/16, is currently not the primary destination for refugees; most refugees remain in Ukraine’s neighboring countries. However, this could change with a further escalation of the war or very high refugee numbers in these countries. Moreover, refugee numbers in Germany are rising sharply, increasingly necessitating the use of initial resources from civil protection and disaster relief to create temporary housing options or ensure basic provisions.
• Ukrainians—this applies only to individuals with a Ukrainian passport and not necessarily to people of other nationalities—can enter the Federal Republic of Germany without a visa. Therefore, in contrast to 2015/16, asylum-related issues do not play an immediate role, and border regimes, especially the German external borders (recall, for example, the dramatic scenes at the Slovenian-Austrian or German-Austrian border), are also not a concern. The necessary support for refugees along the changing escape routes was an additional challenge for civil protection and disaster relief actors or humanitarian emergency aid across the entire Balkan route in 2015/16. This is currently not an issue either, as the transport routes are relatively clear and people are moving with their own vehicles or by train, and at least after leaving Ukraine, are not on foot.
• This also has far-reaching implications for transport logistics: for example, there is currently no need for a nationwide distribution of refugees in Germany or corresponding coordination centers (KoSt-FV) for trains and buses (refer to Dittmer/Lorenz 2020). Instead, refugees can distribute themselves across the country, also supported by special trains operated by Deutsche Bahn. However, since the majority of refugees are currently arriving in Berlin, there are calls for a nationwide distribution. In the meantime, a hub has been established in Hanover to facilitate the distribution of refugees to the federal states. For this purpose, facilities have been set up at the exhibition grounds by the German Red Cross (DRK). Initially, there was hope that the distribution of refugees could function without state intervention. However, people who officially register in Germany are now being distributed to other federal states according to the Königsteiner Schlüssel, which was also relevant in 2015/16. Currently, this means that no refugees who register can stay in Berlin, as Berlin is responsible for only 5% of all refugees according to the Königsteiner Schlüssel.
• Unlike in 2015/16, there is widespread agreement among EU member states regarding the response to the refugee movement. This allowed, for the first time on March 3, 2022, the activation of the EU’s Mass Influx Directive. This results in a completely different status for the refugees than in 2015/16, particularly relieving the asylum systems in Eastern European countries, which likely would not have been able to cope with such an influx, and facilitates integration into further societal systems (housing, education, job market, etc.). In 2015/16, special facilities had to be created for initial registration, such as the waiting rooms in Feldkirchen and Erding, which were also set up and operated with the support of civil protection organizations, the Bundeswehr, and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).
• Structures, learning experiences, and processes from the refugee situation in 2015/16 are still largely in place in 2022 or can be reactivated. Therefore, the government reception structures are fundamentally better positioned than in 2015/16, and this also applies to aid organizations. Although the knowledge still exists, criticism has been voiced, among other things on social media, that in the city of Berlin, professional help and, above all, the necessary support from civil protection started too late.
• On behalf of the Berlin crisis team, aid organizations took over the coordination of refugee arrivals at bus stations, which had previously been mainly managed by spontaneous volunteers or organized volunteers. In other places, such as the Berlin central station, aid organizations initially supplemented spontaneous assistance with medical emergency care upon official requests for assistance. As the spontaneous assistance at Berlin central station is increasingly reaching its spatial and personnel limits, a welcome tent – already too small – was erected in front of the station, and a joint command of the police and fire department has been trying to structure the situation and ensure safety since March 9, 2022.
• Due to the rapidly increasing number of refugees arriving in Berlin, with up to 15,000 daily, and the current limited capacity for further distribution across the country, emergency accommodation measures became necessary. The THW deployed 150 personnel to set up a tent city at the initial reception center in Reinickendorf, equipping it with materials from the BBK and the German Red Cross (DRK). Under the leadership of the DRK, a new arrival and distribution center for refugees is to be established at the former Tegel Airport, capable of accommodating up to 3,000 refugees and distributing 10,000 refugees per day. Additionally, up to 2,500 refugees are to be housed at the Berlin Messe in the former emergency COVID-19 clinic of the state. New accommodations are being created in various Berlin districts. In other cities, such as Frankfurt am Main, volunteer fire departments and the DRK are setting up shelters for refugees. The specifics regarding the personnel (full-time or volunteer) and the legal structure under which the shelters will be operated are currently unclear.
• The rapidly changing situation in Berlin led to a personnel shortage. Berlin’s request for administrative assistance from the Bundeswehr to support the State Office for Refugee Affairs was initially criticized in the media, referring to the primary duties of the Bundeswehr and the existence of civil protection, and subsequently denied. Accordingly, as in the 1950s and again in 2015, the possibility of declaring a state of disaster due to the large number of refugees is being discussed and partly demanded. Whether this calls for the activation of a disaster alarm under the Berlin Disaster Protection Act or rather the declaration of a major damage situation remains unclear.[1] At the same time, there is criticism that THW personnel would be released from their duties, while volunteer emergency personnel from aid organizations are only called upon upon request and only for individual assignments.
• The help from the population seems to be as high today as it was in 2015/16. Even though the aid from civil society was often highly professional back then, a further professionalization can be observed today. At the same time, as in 2015/16, it is evident that the high willingness to donate goods can sometimes overwhelm the organizational structures (including those of civil protection organizations) in terms of capacity. How civil society aid will develop further also crucially depends on what state aid offers exist or are established. Now that it is seen that civil and disaster protection organizations with their volunteer structures are added later on, this could lead to conflicts and “turf battles,” as the very different organizational logics can partly contradict each other, as was the case in 2015/16.
• Even though we are dealing with war refugees both in 2015/16 and today, there seems to be less societal polarization regarding the reception of refugees nowadays. While the humanitarian crisis necessitating the reception of refugees was assessed differently by political actors in 2015/16, there seems to be a much larger political consensus currently. Reasons for this may include that anti-Muslim sentiments and racism are less resonant in society in the current situation, the war is taking place in Europe and is simultaneously seen as an attack on Europe and its political order. The fact that primarily women and children – traditionally defined as victims and vulnerable groups – are fleeing or can leave Ukraine, further facilitates empathy and thus also confirms existing gender stereotypes of military conflicts as well as media representations of “vulnerable refugees.“
• German civil protection organizations, UN agencies, and international humanitarian organizations are currently active in neighboring countries of Ukraine and Ukraine itself as part of humanitarian (foreign) aid, similar to their activities in Greece or along the Balkan route in 2015/16. Unlike 2015/16, which was heavily marked by political disputes among European countries, there currently seems to be a significant alignment between humanitarian and political mandates, which should greatly facilitate the work of these organizations. However, even during 2015/16, there was critical debate over whether Europe, with its financially powerful institutions, should be a field of activity for these organizations, or whether they should focus more on other world regions where state actors have significantly fewer resources. This issue is also being discussed at present.
• While German civil protection organizations made use of a wide range of civil protection structures and resources in 2015/16, there’s only limited utilization of transportation capacities and personnel for transporting relief supplies to Poland, for example, or in supporting partner organizations in Ukraine. Various operations for the supply and accommodation of refugees are now underway, especially in Berlin, but also in other cities. Further deployments of civil and disaster protection services are conceivable, heavily dependent on how the war progresses. It will be fundamentally interesting to see if and to what extent resources from civil and disaster protection are utilized for accommodating, distributing, or providing for refugees nationwide. This need not only arise from necessity; it could also present a good opportunity to deploy and realistically test individual existing modules of the Labor 5000.
• In light of the discussion processes initiated following the refugee situation in 2015/16, which were intensified by recent events like the pandemic and the flood events of 2021, it’s expected that the current refugee situation, in conjunction with the immediacy of a conventional war in close geographical proximity, will raise and update questions regarding the orientation and equipment of civil protection, as well as a reorientation of civil and disaster protection that has already begun in parts. The care and provision for people who cannot return to their homeland for shorter or longer periods will likely be just one of many aspects.

[1] In mid-June 2021, the category “major damage situation” was newly incorporated into the Berlin Civil Protection Act to establish overarching command structures early on, even if the conditions for a disaster are not yet met, but there is a correspondingly increased need for coordination that significantly exceeds the management of everyday hazards.