In the last weeks of 2023, Germany experienced widespread flooding, particularly in the state of Lower Saxony, but also in parts of Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and western Germany. The peak of these winter floods occurred during the Christmas holidays and New Year’s. While winter floods (e.g., along the Rhine) are not uncommon, the winter floods of 2023/24 were complicated by a combination of snowmelt, saturated soil, overflowing reservoirs, prolonged rain, and waterlogged dikes, making crisis management more difficult (Müller-Tischer 2024). The situation worsened with the arrival of frost after the weather calmed down. While the frost-hardened ground allowed heavy equipment to reach the dikes, the frozen water in the dikes posed the risk of frost breaks, and some of the equipment was partially limited in its effectiveness (Müller-Tischer 2024).
Translation of text on slide: EMERGENCY AID IN AND FOR UKRAINE- LESSONS TO LEARN CIVIL PROTECTION; Conference on Disaster Preparedness 2024
On April 23, 2024, as part of the Disaster Preparedness Conference, a session organized by Dr. Daniel F. Lorenz and Dr. Cordula Dittmer was held on emergency aid in Ukraine, particularly discussing what lessons can be learned from these experiences for the context of German civil protection. In this session, four different specialized presentations were given by Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH), Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB), and the Disaster Research Unit (DRU; German: KFS), which presented specific emergency relief measures in Ukraine and discussed various aspects of possible lessons for Germany.
On July 20, 2023, at 4:26 AM, the warning app NINA alerted the residents of the tranquil upper-class enclave Kleinmachnow, located in the south of Berlin, with the message: “Warning of a free roaming big cat.” This message was reiterated at 6:07 AM with the statement: “Warning of a free roaming dangerous wild animal,” accompanied by the additional information: “The wild animal is presumed to be a lioness.”
Exactly 10 years ago, on June 10th, during the Elbe River Flood of 2013, a dike in Fischbeck broke, resulting in the flooding of a large portion of the Elbe-Havel-Land municipality. This region, overwhelmingly rural and sparsely populated, is located east of the Elbe River within the district of Stendal in the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. Even though some areas were completely cut off from the outside world, many residents resisted the government-mandated evacuation orders in order to save their belongings, and, instead, organized themselves autonomously (Dittmer et al. 2016; Schmersal/Voss 2018). In some areas, it took up to 2 weeks for external assistance from disaster management organizations to reach the population. Disaster management assistance came from the Technische Hilfwerk (THW), the German Red Cross, the Johanniter (JUH) and the German Federal Defense Forces (Bundeswehr). The population that followed the evacuation orders and sought refuge in private accommodations and/or emergency shelters in the surrounding areas of Stendal, Jerichow and Havelberg returned to the area weeks later, some finding their homes barely habitable.
Disaster Research Unit (Katastrophenforschungsstelle); Cordula Dittmer
Original German version published December 7, 2022
Translated version published July 30, 2024
In 1984, Lars Clausen and Wolf R- Dombrowsky, pioneers of German Catastrophe-Sociology and founders of the Disaster Research Center (Katastrophenforschungstelle) at Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, described the concept of warning systems:
“In negative terms, a warning system is a technical apparatus, which, even in perfect functionality, is meaningless as a “bare warning”. A warning without reference to understandably dangerous natural hazards and related reactions of those warned, is not able to exist. Without these considerations, the communication measures are simply a “forecast” of scientific patterns. Warnings must be more, they should specifically foster social behaviors that aim to prevent the predicted event, ie the disaster, not to happen. One can only speak of a socially functional warning system if all related matters are discussed, a wide range of anticipated dangers are defined, technical consideration are considered and public reactions are addressed.” (translated from the original)
While public debates over the aspects of a successful warning- such as those observed in the last few days- often focus on the possibilities and limits of the use of operationalized technical tools, the Disaster Research Unit (KFS in German) instead aims its attention at the social preconditions for communication. The basic assumption is that warning should not be understood as a linear transfer of information whose success is primarily dependent on the technical transfer of information from sender to receiver. Instead, communication is to be understood as a complex social process that has various preconditions on different levels. The specific warning address, that is operationalized as a warning in acute situations, is interconnected with previous (disaster) communication, as well as, the experiences, expectations, situational patterns, etc. of a heterogenous, constantly changing population. As a result, any specific warning results in diverse receptions and interpretations. To fully understand the preconditions of a successful warning, it is essential that these social factors be considered.
At the DRU and the Akademie der Katastrophenforschungsstelle (AKFS), we are involved in various trans- and interdisciplinary projects that address topics of communication in general and warnings specifically. As such, we are led by the assumption that warnings can’t be successful without proper consideration of socio-cultural, economic, historic, and political (ie examining society as a whole).
“Not everyone is here in the same now. They are only there on the outside, in that they can be seen today. But this does not mean that they live with the others at the same time. Rather, they carry something from the past with them, which interferes” (translated quote from Bloch 1973: 104)
Immediately after the devastating heavy rainfall events in North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate in July 2021, the Disaster Research Centre (KFS) at Freie Universität Berlin published a short statement on the contribution that the KFS has made so far in research projects for the analysis of various flood and heavy rainfall events in the past and how these could also be taken up in current research projects as part of the reappraisal. On the anniversary of the events, the following blog post takes stock of further work carried out since then and presents preliminary results[1].
Since the summer of 2015, we at the KFS initially focused on the KatFlucht project, and from October 2018 onwards, on the WAKE project to examine the management of the refugee situation in 2015/16 by German and European civil protection and disaster relief agencies. That less than seven years later we would again be facing massive refugee movements in Europe was unforeseeable. In the (social) media, references to the end of World War II or to 2015/16 are increasingly being made. UNHCR describes it as an exodus, which occurs extremely rarely. UNHCR has now classified the situation in Ukraine as a “Level 3 emergency” the highest category. As of March 28, 2022, UNHCR has registered 3,901,713 refugees; in addition, there is a nearly twice as large number of internally displaced persons in Ukraine. Our analytical focus is on the response to the situation by governmental and non-governmental actors, especially civil protection and disaster relief: We are currently observing both very similar and quite different forms of coping compared to 2015/16.
In den letzten Wochen des Jahres 2023 kam es in Deutschland, insbesondere im Bundesland Niedersachsen, aber auch in Teilen Thüringens, Sachsens, Sachsen-Anhalts und im Westen Deutschlands zu großflächigen Überflutungen. Die Hochphase dieses Winterhochwassers fiel über die Weihnachtsfeiertage sowie Silvester. Winterhochwasser (z. B. am Rhein) sind keine Seltenheit, allerdings hatte man es bei den Winterhochwassern 2023/24 mit einer Kombination von Schneeschmelze, gesättigten Böden, volllaufenden Talsperren, langanhaltendem Regen und vollgesogenen Deichen zu tun, was die Lagebewältigung erschwerte (Müller-Tischer 2024). Durch den nach Wetterberuhigung eintretenden Frost verschärfte sich die Lage nochmals. Die Anfahrt an die Deiche mit schwerem Gerät war durch den frostharten Boden zwar möglich, gefrorenes Wasser in den Deichen barg allerdings die Gefahr von Frostbrüchen und die Einsatzmittel waren teilweisen in ihrer Tauglichkeit eingeschränkt (Müller-Tischer 2024).
Am 23. April 2024 fand im Rahmen der Fachtagung Katastrophenvorsorge eine von Daniel F. Lorenz und Cordula Dittmer organisierte Session zur Nothilfe in der Ukraine und der Frage, welche Lehren aus den Erfahrungen für den deutschen Zivilschutz gezogen werden können, statt. Dazu wurden durch vier verschiedene Fachvorträge der Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), der Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH), des Arbeiter-Samariter-Bundes (ASB) sowie der Katastrophenforschungsstelle (KFS) konkrete Nothilfemaßnahmen in der Ukraine vorgestellt und verschie-dene Aspekte möglicher Lehren für Deutschland diskutiert.
Am 20. Juli 2023 weckte die Warn-App NINA die Bewohner*innen des beschaulichen Oberschichtghettos Kleinmachnow, im Süden von Berlin um 4:26 Uhr mit der Nachricht: „Warnung vor freilaufender Raubkatze“, die um 6:07 Uhr nochmals erneuert wurde mit der Botschaft „Warnung vor einem freilaufenden gefährlichen Wildtier“ und der Ergänzung „Bei dem Wildtier soll es sich vermutlich um eine Löwin handeln“.
Empfohlen wurde in weiteren Warnungen, das Haus möglichst nicht zu verlassen und Haustiere ins Haus zu holen. Grundlage der Warnungen war ein relativ verpixeltes in der Nacht aufgenommenes Video, auf dem nach Aussagen der Beobachtenden sowie der Polizei, relativ eindeutig eine Löwin zu sehen wäre, wie sie nach erfolgter – ebenfalls beobachteter – Wildschweinjagd das erlegte Wildschwein fräße.
Daraufhin erfolgte eine 36-stündige Suchaktion von Berliner und Brandenburger Polizeibeamt*innen, Amtstierärzt*innen, Jäger*innen, Fährtensucher*innen und schwerem Gerät.
