By: Nicolas Bock, Cordula Dittmer, Verena Flörchinger und Peter Windsheimer
Original version (German) published: July 26, 2024
Translated version published: September 25, 2024
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-45310
In the last weeks of 2023, Germany experienced widespread flooding, particularly in the state of Lower Saxony, but also in parts of Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and western Germany. The peak of these winter floods occurred during the Christmas holidays and New Year’s. While winter floods (e.g., along the Rhine) are not uncommon, the winter floods of 2023/24 were complicated by a combination of snowmelt, saturated soil, overflowing reservoirs, prolonged rain, and waterlogged dikes, making crisis management more difficult (Müller-Tischer 2024). The situation worsened with the arrival of frost after the weather calmed down. While the frost-hardened ground allowed heavy equipment to reach the dikes, the frozen water in the dikes posed the risk of frost breaks, and some of the equipment was partially limited in its effectiveness (Müller-Tischer 2024).
However, from a hydrological perspective, this winter flood did not qualify as an extreme event like those of 2002, 2013, or even 2021 (Bringewski 2024). The flood situation was predictable and relatively well-managed, allowing for planned evacuations, targeted flooding, dike breaches, and even the opening of the Pretziner Weir in Saxony-Anhalt as a preemptive relief measure (Carstensen et al. 2024). Unlike the flash floods and heavy rain events in the Ahr Valley in 2021, the water rose slowly, there was minimal flow damage, and comprehensive structural flood protection (dikes) and adequate warning time were available (Müller-Tischer 2024).
According to the General Association of Insurers, the damage to infrastructure amounted to approximately 200 million euros (Gesamtverband der Versicherer 2024) because homeowners are still insufficiently insured against heavy rain and flooding (Wille 2024a; Hoffmann 2023b; Wille 2024b; Endres 2024) or because the damage was caused not by river flooding but by the rising groundwater table, for which insurance does not cover (as in the case of the Nordhausen district).
Outside the affected regions, the population was relatively unaware of the extent, impacts, or management of the situation during the Christmas holidays. However, certain headlines made it into the media during the holiday season, such as reports of “sandbag theft” (NDR 2023, 2024) or disaster tourism (Kolhoff 2024; Bäuml et al. 2024; NDR 2024), which were interpreted by some as harbingers of civil war-like conditions and the end of social behavior (Kolhoff 2024). In some cases, false reports spread on social media, attempting to undermine public trust in government disaster management by falsely accusing it of improper prioritization and actions not primarily focused on the well-being of the population (MDR 2024; Thom 2024). Additionally, there was much discussion about the state of the dikes and the (insufficient) flood protection (Kuhn 2024; Iser 2024). After the holidays, politicians and disaster protection officials called for improved equipment, even though there had been no reports of significant gaps or challenges in disaster management up to that point (Deutschlandfunk 2023; dpa and Dedy 2023; Evangelische Zeitung 2024; Grzeschik 2024; Meier and Rebhan 2024; Strauß 2024).
The following blog post resulted from quick-response research initiated during the winter floods of 2023/24. In addition to a comprehensive media analysis, six expert interviews were conducted with individuals from civil protection and at the district level in the districts of Mansfeld-Südharz (Saxony-Anhalt) and Nordhausen (Thuringia) (January/February 2024). The fact that further similar or even more devastating floods have since occurred in various regions of Germany poses challenges for scientific analysis and processing. Due to the rapidly increasing frequency of such events caused by accelerating climate change, research is struggling to keep up with the events.
In the following post, we will provide an assessment of the media coverage of the winter floods of 2023/24 from a disaster sociology perspective. This will serve to contextualize dominant discourses and common narratives, particularly regarding antisocial behavior among the population during extreme events. In a second blog post, we will present the perspective of disaster protection.
Behavior of the Population I: “The Sandbag Theft”
Reports of antisocial behavior by the population, such as sandbag theft, disaster tourism (NDR 2024), or the disregard of official directives, such as the ban on entering the dike (NDR 2023), received significant attention in social and public media. Some commentators used these incidents to highlight—and the public often shared and confirmed this view—the perceived collapse of social order:
“Never before have we heard of people stealing sandbags from the dikes, as happened in various places, to secure their own properties. Or even generators used to power pumps. Nor has there ever been such massive gawking tourism at the flood site… These are likely phenomena of our time. Unrestrained individualism combined with selfishness and a craving for entertainment. What emerges in part of the population is antisocial behavior and total disinterest in the community. These unfortunate side effects of the Christmas flood of 2023 are harbingers of what the great climate crisis will bring. Even now, it is becoming clear that there will be three groups: those who try to prevent the worst and save what can be saved; those who just gawk, which is the majority; and those who want to make a final profit from the crisis” (Kolhoff 2024).
However, in an interview with the president of the Fire Brigade Association, Banse, it becomes clear that the people accused of stealing sandbags did so “to protect their homes” because they lacked sandbags themselves (NDR 2024). The prioritization of dike protection and flood control was not widely understood, leading to discussions and insults directed at emergency personnel (Interview 3 Civil Protection). “There are insults, there are discussions with those affected, asking why the water was pumped out of Street A before Street B. Why did my neighbor have the fire department in their basement before I did” (Daniel 2023).
For the local press, the topic of sandbag theft seemed of interest, but for the professional actors in the crisis teams of the surveyed districts, it was not an issue (Interview 1 Civil Protection; Interview 3 Civil Protection). It was noted that there was a functioning social structure and social control in the respective regions (Interview 2 Administration).
Lessons to Learn The population is often not sufficiently informed about how disaster response operations are conducted, who is involved, and that prioritization may be necessary and how it is carried out.
Behavior of the Population II: Hindering the Work of Emergency Responders
Another aspect highlighted in the media was that the population, by disregarding the disaster response guidelines, endangered themselves or compromised the integrity of the dikes. Reports mentioned people returning to their homes prematurely before the restrictions were lifted (Bäuml et al. 2024). In one instance, a self-organized rescue operation endangered three individuals, who were only saved by chance (Bäuml et al. 2024). Another case involved “diesel theft from an emergency excavator” (Stadt Oldenburg 2024), which had been prepared for a potential emergency dike opening at the Osternburger Kanal in Oldenburg. Although the dike didn’t need to be opened, the theft disrupted the emergency strategy and could have caused severe damage. Dealing with “dike tourists” and onlookers was particularly problematic, as their presence not only hindered the work of the emergency responders but also risked dike breaches by stepping on the saturated dikes (Daniel 2023; Becker 2023). In Oldenburg, around 200 violations of the dike access ban were recorded, each fined between 300 and 400 euros (Stadt Oldenburg 2024).
These behaviors complicate the work of emergency responders and can jeopardize effective prevention and response efforts. Politicians addressed these incidents, urging the public to allow the responders to do their work without interference. For instance, the Interior Minister of Lower Saxony emphasized that social cohesion involves setting aside selfishness, especially in emergencies (ZEIT ONLINE 2023). However, whether these reported incidents accurately reflected the reality or were significant compared to the overall successful collaboration between emergency responders and the population was not critically examined. As a result, a narrative of a selfish society was widely circulated, particularly on social media. Reporting is, of course, essential for informing the public in such a situation; statements and appeals from politicians are also understandable. It is likewise not out of the question that some individuals may not adhere to guidelines or may be uncertain about how they should behave—especially in a widespread situation. However, it has been observed that reporting, particularly on social media, has distorted the overall picture of the situation: During the winter floods, as well as in other disasters, calm and almost universally social behavior of the population was reported (Interview 4, Civil Protection).
Lessons to Learn Reporting in public and social media must be based on the real circumstances, especially during a disaster. The sensationalization of individual events or the misconduct of a few should not be used to make generalizations.
Behavior of the Population III: Crisis Communication
To prevent rule violations or uninformed behavior and counteract associated activities, educational, creative, and innovative approaches in professionalized crisis communication can be helpful—such as the initiative taken by the city of Oldenburg in response to “dike tourists.” To further curb the unwanted ‘dike tourism’ and provide the public with a view from above, the city promptly published several drone videos from the Fire Department’s drone group on its website, which were clicked on numerous times (City of Oldenburg 2024). Whether this measure has significantly reduced dike tourism still needs to be analyzed. Nevertheless, coupled with additional information, this approach has the potential to inform the public and influence behavior.
Lessons to Learn Creative and spontaneous initiatives, as well as transparency in direct crisis communication from the responsible authorities, are essential to encourage the public to assist and cooperate.
Another example of successful crisis communication with the public was demonstrated in the municipality of Heringen/Helme in the southern Harz region: Due to the numerous offers of assistance and the high demand for information from the affected population, a citizen hotline was promptly set up through voluntary assistance (Interview 2, Administration). Additionally, a dedicated volunteer email address facilitated the coordination of aid offers, and a donation account was set up. These resources, along with updates on the current situation, were communicated through press releases, while local leaders regularly addressed citizens via social media, keeping them informed in real-time (Instagram 2023; Interview 2, Administration).
During the flood situation in the southern Harz, the crisis communication strategy relied on voluntary action, with a potential evacuation of a village being recommended rather than enforced through mandatory orders. To support this, a suitable communication and information infrastructure was established, and residents were kept informed. The majority of the population followed the recommendation to evacuate (Interview 2, Administration).
Crisis Communication and False Information from Authorities
Crisis communication through social media has become an essential tool for quickly and directly providing (potentially) affected individuals with important information about the development of disaster situations (Interview 2, Administration). However, it also requires close and experienced supervision (Interview 5, Administration; Kracke 2023).
Although false reports on social media during the winter floods of 2023/24 were relatively rare, there were still some cases where disinformation (Hoffmann 2023a) was deliberately spread. The goal was to undermine public trust in the crisis management capabilities of public officials and to sow confusion. For instance, decision-makers were accused of having misplaced priorities, such as allegedly prioritizing animal protection over flood control. One specific case claimed that a flood retention basin had not been emptied in time due to the protection of cranes. However, this was denied by the responsible authorities (MDR 2024). Another widely circulated false claim asserted that refugees were deliberately employed as disaster relief workers during a local visit by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, while other helpers were sent home. Despite there being little overlap between the chancellor’s visit and the relief efforts, and no other volunteers being dismissed (Stubert 2024), this misinformation spread quickly and was shared by local politicians affiliated with the AfD (Interview 5, Administration). Furthermore, corrections from involved officials were systematically discredited, and those who attempted to clarify the situation were subjected to harassment, forcing them to withdraw their statements online (Interview 2, Administration). There were also false reports about evacuations (Oldenburger Onlinezeitung 2023; Tagesschau 2023; OS Kurier 2023), alleged looting (Buten un Binnen 2023), and accusations that other EU countries had not provided aid to Germany during the floods, while Germany allegedly overspent its own resources during disasters in other countries (Mimikama 2024).
Lessons to Learn Social media should be regarded as its own operational unit, especially in crisis communication. While it has the potential to become a curse, if used effectively, it can be a blessing.
Behavior of the Population IV: Willingness to Help
In all affected regions, solidarity and willingness to help were evident. For example, in Meppen, five individuals had to be rescued from a house surrounded by water using a tractor after the fire department initially struggled to evacuate them with a boat (ZEIT ONLINE 2023). Restaurants provided food, volunteers actively engaged in filling sandbags (Nord-West-Media TV 2024), and the needs of the helpers were ensured. A donation account was established to mobilize financial resources for reconstruction efforts. Regional and inter-city assistance, such as the provision of sandbag-filling machines from partner cities (City of Braunschweig 2024), functioned smoothly.
The influx of both material and personnel assistance was so substantial in many areas that local forces spent more time managing these offers than actually addressing the immediate flood response. The Christmas holidays also contributed to this, as many people had time off:
“And still, it seems that the people in the district share one feeling during these days: the sense that they can only master the situation together—and the openness toward all those who come by to help or report. This is the case in Oberröblingen. And it is the same in the disaster control staff of the district. Anyone calling there these days as a press representative receives information. Friendly and attentive, despite everything. Around the clock” (Fürstenberg and Deutschländer 2024).
Since this flood situation was prolonged, the emergency response teams reached their limits: “The mood is still good, but some responders are nearing their breaking point. With each passing day that the situation remains tense, it becomes more challenging to counteract exhaustion. In such circumstances, positive moments for the helpers are small islands amid this truly demanding flood situation” (Oldenburger Onlinezeitung 2023).
This mutual assistance was also emphasized by interviewees. Reports indicated that people expressed their gratitude to the responders (Interview 4, Civil Protection) and brought homemade cakes to the readiness rooms (Moin Oldenburg! Dein Stadtpodcast 2024). Helping wasn’t just about carrying sandbags; it included the “surrounding support,” such as the indirect assistance and supply of resources to the responders by the community (Interview 4, Civil Protection). Numerous businesses also supported the emergency teams. For instance, grocery stores allowed responders to shop outside regular hours. A gas station provided fuel and billed it afterward. A local garden center supplied technical equipment without charging for it (up until the time of the interview). A pizza company donated a sales stand and pizzas for the staging area. Solidarity extended beyond the county borders (Interview 5, Administration).
Lessons to Learn The willingness to help among the population is generally high. People only behave recklessly or selfishly in exceptional cases—usually when there was already significant social inequality before the event occurred.
What is a sociological explanation for the diverse representations of disasters?
The presented analysis paints a picture of population behavior characterized by empathy, willingness to help, and solidarity alongside individual inappropriate behaviors and risky situations during the winter floods of 2023/24. Despite these predominantly positive experiences reported by participants, some respondents also perceive a polarization in society and a growing rejection of state authorities, particularly evident in social media (Interview 5, Administration). The situation during the floods, which yielded contrasting experiences, is labeled an exception, attributed to “such a situation” (Interview 5, Administration).
In the recently published sociological study “Trigger Points” (Mau et al. 2024), it becomes clear that this discrepancy between the perception of general societal polarization and very social personal experiences fundamentally characterizes contemporary society. The study highlights that the feeling of a divided society on many issues does not correspond to the actual social landscape. It examines four “arenas of inequality”: poverty and wealth; migration; diversity and gender; climate protection. In these areas, a consensus has largely been reached. This means that “most people tend to be much closer to the center than to the fringes” (Mau et al. 2024: 381). Looking at the structure of societal group positioning on key political issues, it can be observed that, contrary to public discourse, these groups do not stand in unyielding opposition to one another; rather, a broad consensus exists. The authors conclude: “The image of a politically and socially divided society thus proves to be false. Moreover, a look at the last decades shows that, despite all assertions to the contrary, there are no signs of increasing polarization in our four arenas” (Mau et al. 2024: 381). In fundamental guiding principles, the majority of society is in agreement. However, conflicts do exist, but they are specific in nature and revolve more around the handling of issues than the content of the issues themselves.
If there is no actual polarization, the question arises as to what causes this perception. Mau et al. (2024) analyze several aspects. One aspect is the intensified activation of political conflicts along the fringes. As a result, the outer areas of opinion landscapes currently dominate the much larger center:
“Whereas the relevant population segments were previously integrated into established interest organizations and thus tended to be ‘quiet,’ independent, ‘loud,’ and sometimes overstated mobilization forms have now emerged at the fringes that decide on the politicization and depoliticization of issues. The broad societal center, on the other hand, is depoliticized and only weakly party-politically bound, which weakens its mobilization and articulation capabilities. Thus, it appears acoustically muted; it is drowned out and is overall less audible. The formation of conflict in public space now primarily unfolds through the politicized fringes, creating the (false) impression that society is breaking down into two or fewer clearly distinguishable camps” (Mau et al. 2024: 378).
Disaster sociologists Clausen and Dombrowsky already addressed the question in 1983 of whether people develop willingness to help and self-help capabilities in a neoliberal performance society characterized by a prevailing “taboo […], in which one knows no fear; […], in which failure is frowned upon” (Clausen and Dombrowsky 1983: 177). Only the possibility of admitting weaknesses enables solidarity. This is significantly easier in the context of more neighborly or regional assistance than in the overall societal context. At the same time, there needs to be a societal consensus that risks are distributed relatively equitably across different social groups and that there are shared values and norms (Clausen and Dombrowsky 1983). This societal consensus is currently being challenged by the “politicized fringes” (as noted above) and reinforced by the narrative that risks are not evenly distributed.
Conclusion
The winter floods—like other extreme situations, crises, and disasters in the past—act as a magnifying glass for existing societal discourses and realities. They serve as “over-dimensional tests for both the maturity level of entire societies and their ability to collectively prevent risks, as well as for the maturity level of individuals who, in case of doubt, must escape the collective incapacity” (Clausen and Dombrowsky 1983: 161).
As demonstrated by the management of the winter floods of 2023/24, solidarity and support remain evident despite opposing trends in public and social media (see for the flood events of 2013 and 2021 Dittmer and Lorenz 2023, 2024; Voss et al. 2022). It becomes clear that sensitive and informed media coverage plays an underestimated role in managing such situations (see also the current study by Prinzing et al. 2024).
Bibliography
Clausen, Lars; Dombrowsky, Wolf (1983): Vorsicht Glas! Ratgeber für erhöhte Gefahr. Bonn: Bundesamt für Zivilschutz.
Interview 1 Bevölkerungsschutz: Interview 1 Bevölkerungsschutz. Hochwasser in der VOST, Gründungsmitglied – Gruppe Digitale Lageerkennung, stellv. Leitung, hauptamtlich beim BKK.
Interview 2 Administration: Interview 2 Verwaltung.
Interview 3 Civil Protection: Interview 3 Civil Protection.
Interview 4 Civil Protection: Interview 4 Civil Protection.
Interview 5 Administration: Interview 5 Verwaltung.
Mau, Steffen; Lux, Thomas; Westheuser, Linus (2024): Triggerpunkte. Konsens und Konflikt in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft. 7. Publisher: Suhrkamp Verlag.